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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes a case of organizational learning in the Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger. 
This organizational learning process was generated from demands that were external to the organization and it was pos-
sible thanks to the way in which Ministry’s departments interacted with the governmental internal control agency (Of-
fice of the Comptroller General), and thanks to the Ministry’s specific conditions, both organizational and contingent. 
This paper demonstrates that building dialogue in the process of auditing and inspection led to improvement in the con-
trol process and also in public policy management. Both the Office of the Comptroller General and the Ministry of So-
cial Development underwent learning processes. Office’s analysts needed to learn the working and implementation 
logic of a new policy in social development area (the Unified Social Welfare System), and the Ministry employees 
needed to produce rules and administrative procedures to support the inspection, as well as review concepts and proce-
dures involved in Ministry’s relationship with municipalities. 
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1. Introduction 
The goal of the research from which this paper originated 
was to analyze the impact of the Brazilian government’s 
agency in charge of internal control on public policy 
management. The investigation was guided by two di- 
mensions: promoting both governmental accountability 
and efficiency in public policy implementation. The re- 
search’s theoretical frameworks therefore came from 
literature on political accountability and on governmental 
controls, examining how institutional arrangements work 
to hold politicians and bureaucrats accountable for the 
results of public policies [1]. 
One of the unexpected results, however, was identified 
as an abundant process of organizational learning, which 
we describe in this paper, and for which analysis we turn 
to the theoretical framework of [2]. 
In this introduction, we briefly describe the recent 
transformations undergone by the Brazilian political and 
administrative system and highlight the advances in so- 
cial areas, given that our analysis covers the relationship  
between the controlling agency and the Ministry in 
charge of social welfare policies. 
The Brazilian political system has endured profound 
institutional transformations since the country’s rede- 
mocratization and approval of the democratic Constitu- 
tion of 1988. As of then, our press is free, our political 
parties compete and our elections are regular and fair in 
Legislative and Executive Powers at all three levels of 
government: federal, state and municipal1. In addition, 
popular participation mechanisms were broadened and 
deepened through collegiate forums such as councils and 
conferences, and institutions promoting transparency and 
accountability of governmental actions were strength- 
ened. 
In the areas of education, health and social welfare, the 
restructuring and broadening of public policies, in accor- 
dance with the constitutional principles of universal and  
free service, were a great deal responsible for the social 
1Brazil is the only federative country in the world with three levels of
politically autonomous government levels, as per article 1st of the 1988
Constitution. 
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advances of the last 20 years, which promoted social 
inclusion of a large contingency of people until then not 
attended by public services. 
Despite such improvement, there are still many chal- 
lenges to overcome in order to consolidate Rule of Law 
in the country. In the field of public safety and guaran- 
teeing human rights, for instance, we must progress in 
eradicating police violence against the poorer population. 
In the judicial arena, we must increase people’s access 
and reduce the duration of litigations. In politics, we are 
still struggling with corruption and clientelism practices 
in dealing with public goods. 
In this paper’s specific case of interest, there are two 
institutional advancements in the Brazilian democratic 
order that are worth noting. First, the institutionalization 
of the system of checks and balances, encompassing not 
only the traditional agencies of external control, such as 
the Brazilian Court of Audit (TCU—Tribunal de Contas 
da União), but also creating a new agency that centralizes 
internal control of federal public administration, the 
Office of the Comptroller General (CGU—Controladoria 
Geral da União), which became the Executive Power’s 
agency in charge of policies for promoting transparency 
and fighting corruption. The second advancement in- 
volves the creation of new governmental agencies in 
charge of social policies, such as the Ministry of Social 
Development and Fight against Hunger (MSD—Mini- 
stério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome), 
and the reorganization of social welfare programs, which 
explain the improvement of social indicators on one hand 
and, on the other, suggest the existence of organizational 
learning and innovation processes. 
MDS was created in 2004, in the second year of the 
Lula administration, with the purpose of integrating poli- 
cies for social welfare, hunger combatting and income 
transference. Its main programs are currently the Family 
Allowance Program (PBF—Programa Bolsa Família) 
and the Unified Social Welfare System (SUAS—Sistema 
Único de Assistência Social). 
PBF is an income transference program for families in 
vulnerable situations, and which seeks to increase family 
access to basic social rights by means of the imposed 
conditions for continuing to receive the benefit: children 
are required to attend school and family members are 
required to present themselves at health and social wel- 
fare offices. It was launched in 2003, as a result of the 
Lula administration’s strategy of centralizing the existing 
poverty reduction policies, characterized by fragmenta- 
tion and weak results. Over the last years, the program’s 
management mechanisms were improved (such as the 
Cadastro Único—Single Enrollment, an informatized 
system of enrolling current and future beneficiaries), 
presently counting over 20 million low-income families, 
of which 13.4 million receive PBF. 
In addition, PBF requires a great deal of political and 
institutional articulation, as it is jointly executed by the 
three federative levels. The federal government is re- 
sponsible for resources and regulation, and the states and 
municipalities for selecting beneficiaries (according to 
federal directives), for enrolling them in the system and 
for monitoring their compliance with the imposed condi- 
tions. In this way, the Cadastro provides all three gov- 
ernment levels with information, new due to its scope 
and up-to-date status, on the social and economic condi- 
tions of benefited families (housing, sanitation, income, 
employment etc.) and on their access to the services set 
forth as imposed conditions in education, health and so- 
cial welfare [3]. 
In the case of education, there are approximately 17 
million children and teenagers in PBF with school atten- 
dance being monitored. Most (86.67%) attend elemen- 
tary school, which corresponds to 40% of all enrollments 
at that level of schooling. Regarding the imposed condi- 
tions in the field of health, approximately 6 million chil- 
dren (up to the age of 7) and 14 million women (from 14 
to 44 years of age) are served. In social welfare, the 
Child Labor Eradication Program (PETI—Programa de 
Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil) covers over 800 thou- 
sand beneficiaries, of which approximately 90% are in 
the PBF public. Given that many families have benefici- 
aries monitored in more than one field, there are millions 
of citizens served by health, education and social welfare 
policies in a priority manner [3]. 
SUAS was structured from 2005 onwards, by MDS, as 
a way of overcoming the former standard of providing 
social services (characterized by the philanthropic nature 
of the activities and by clientelism practices) and one of 
its main goals is to organize social services into a net- 
work of protection for families benefited by income 
transference programs. It is a decentralized system of 
producing social welfare actions, structured as deter- 
mined by the new Organic Law of Social Welfare 
(LOAS—Lei Orgânica de Assistência Social, of 1993), 
which is deemed a great advancement for defining social 
welfare as a right of the citizen, and not as charity. 
Among its principles are transparency and universal ac- 
cess to the social welfare benefits, services and programs, 
and its implementation strategy essentially involves co- 
operation between the three federative levels, since the 
federal government is in charge of financing and regu- 
lating the service and the states and municipalities are in 
charge of its financing and execution. 
As previously indicated, these recent initiatives by 
democratic governments in Brazil have considerably im- 
proved social conditions in the country. Although there  
are still almost 40 million Brazilians living in poverty 
conditions—20% of the country’s population, since 2001 
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the income of the poor grew almost three times more 
(8%) than the national average (2.7%) and almost four 
times more than that of the rich (1.5%) and social ine-
quality—one of the highest in the world—began to 
slowly fall: the Gini index decreased from 0.535 in 2004 
to 0.509 in 2009 [4]. Most of the responsibility for this 
reduction is attributed to employment revenues and sala- 
ries (66%), but the income transference programs, 
headed by the Bolsa Família, contributed with 17%, a 
greater proportion than traditional welfare benefits which 
contributed approximately 15% [5]. 
This paper seeks to examine the organizational learn- 
ing processes resulting from the relationship established 
between CGU and MDS. Such approach is quite innova- 
tive in this area of Brazilian public administration, not 
just because of the focus on relationships between gov- 
ernmental management and control, but equally from the 
point of view of organizational studies. 
The following text is thus organized: initially we pre- 
sent the characteristics of the Brazilian system of checks 
and balances and the role of CGU in promoting govern- 
mental accountability and transparency; in the second 
part, we analyze documents related to SUAS implemen- 
tation and inspections, and data obtained in interviews 
with employees directly involved in inspections from 
CGU and the National Secretariat for Social Welfare 
(SNAS—Secretaria Nacional de Assistência Social). 
Analysis of the relationship between CGU and MDS’s 
SNAS allowed for a discussion of the factors that pro- 
moted or hindered organizational learning in those agen- 
cies. Such learning may be defined as a double-loop, 
since SNAS altered rules and procedures of the SUAS 
implementation process. There are also suggestions of 
deuterolearning process, given that SNAS intends to 
create its own mechanisms of inspecting public policies, 
with the purpose of producing information on the SUAS 
implementation that may be useful in new processes for 
improving policy management. 
Among the results of this analysis, we have found that 
factors promoting organizational learning included the 
collaboration relationship established between CGU 
analysts and SNAS employees during the inspection 
process and certain institutional and political traits of 
MDS, among which its low level of institutionalization, 
the availability of high-level personnel and their open- 
ness to the culture of public policy evaluation. Special 
merit may be attributed to this Ministry’s privileged po- 
sition before others, given its responsibility for imple- 
menting a program, Bolsa Família, it is essential to en- 
sure political legitimacy for the President of the Repub- 
lic. 
In our conclusions, we indicate that CGU’s work pro- 
motes organizational learning in the public agencies, it 
inspects factors such as those agencies’ low level of in-
stitutionalization, the relative weakness of corporative 
interests from its bureaucracy or from social groups re-
lated thereto and CGU’s own work seems to have accel-
erated the learning process. 
2. CGU in the Brazilian Governmental 
Accountability System and Municipality 
Monitoring 
The control of government is one of the normative re- 
quirements for proper functioning of representative de- 
mocracy and public bureaucracy; therefore, it is expected 
that government agents’ actions and the results of their 
policies be liable to permanent monitoring and sanctions. 
The actions of elected politicians, appointed high-level 
managers and career employees must be subjected to 
inspection mechanisms. Thus, the institutions created to 
ensure control of the government are based on the checks 
and balances between the Powers: these are independent, 
but must mutually control one another to avoid power 
abuse and to promote exercise of the government pub- 
licly and for the public2. 
In Brazil, the 1988 Constitution reinforced the power 
of control agencies as guardians of legality and probity in 
public management, slowly unleashing modernization 
processes in their internal organizational structures aim- 
ing at better qualifying them for their constitutional at- 
tributions. Several agencies and entities are in charge of 
controlling Brazilian Federal Public Administration (FPA), 
forming a complex system. According to article 70 of the 
Federal Constitution, control is divided into external and 
internal. The former is exercised by the National Con-
gress and the latter by “the internal control system of 
each Power”, with the CGU centralizing such system in 
the Executive Power. National Congress relies on the 
Brazilian Court of Audit (TCU) for external control, 
which corresponds to the “accounting courts” model. 
Working in parallel to these agencies directly occupied 
with monitoring and audit activities are institutions that 
participate in other steps resulting of the monitoring and 
aud it processes, especially in cases where irregularities 
and frauds are uncovered, such as police investigation and 
criminal prosecution, which befall to the Federal Police, 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judicial Power3. 
2As per [6], control of government agents is a crucial dimension of a 
democratic order: “If men were angels, no government would be nec-
essary. If men were ruled by angels, the government would not need 
internal and external controls. Dependence upon the people is un-
doubtedly the primary control on the government, but experience has 
taught humankind that additional precautions are necessary”.  
3Recent studies have shown significant transformations in the country’s 
control agencies since redemocratization, such as the courts of audit 
([7,8]), and have equally highlighted the political role played by others, 
such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office [9] and the Federal Secretariat of 
Internal Control [10]. 
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As control institutions were strengthened, the adminis- 
trative reforms undergone by the country during the 
1990s also placed the issues of public policy managerial 
efficiency and performance in the national agenda. Con- 
trol agencies, especially TCU and CGU, took on sup- 
porting (and sometimes leading) roles in demanding pub- 
lic policy compliance with the principles of legality, pro- 
bity and efficiency. Recent studies suggest that inspec- 
tion and auditing processes carried out by control agen- 
cies ended up working as powerful instruments to pro- 
mote transparency, accountability and quality in public 
management. 
CGU gained enormous relevance in the last years due 
to the increase in its inspection and auditing activities 
and to the new association of said activities with proc- 
esses of promoting transparency and quality in public 
management. These changes are due to the internal con- 
trol system restructuring process, initiated with the crea- 
tion of the Federal Secretariat of Internal Control (SFC— 
Secretaria Federal de Controle Interno) in 1994 and con-
solidated with the creation of CGU in its current format 
in 2003. 
CGU was created in 2002, as Office of Internal Affairs 
(Corregedoria), and in 2003 it was changed to Office of 
the Comptroller General. Since then, it has been within 
the structure of the Republic’s Presidency, thus occupy- 
ing a supervision position with regard to the Ministries, 
and is responsible for technical supervision and norma- 
tive guidance of the four agencies that comprise the fed- 
eral government’s integrity systems: 
 Federal Secretariat of Internal Control, in charge of 
the Internal Control System, 
 Office of Internal Affairs, through the Corrections 
System, 
 Office of the Ombudsman-General (Ouvidoria Geral 
da União), through the ombudsman units, and 
 Secretariat for Preventing Corruption and Strategic 
Information, through the function of preventing and 
fighting corruption in the Executive Power. 
The Federal Secretariat of Internal Control carries out 
activities of evaluating government program executions 
and verifying legality of budget, asset and financial 
management of the Federal Executive agencies. Decen- 
tralized control actions, or monitoring use of federal 
funds by the state and municipalities, are carried out by 
Regional Comptroller Offices (CRU—Controladorias- 
Regionais da União), which are CGU agencies existing  
in all states of the federation. 
The Office of Internal Affairs supervises investigation 
of responsibilities for managers’ administrative irregu- 
larities in the Federal Executive agencies, application of 
the corresponding sanctions and replacing any losses to 
the public treasuries. The Office of Internal Affairs is 
responsible for the activity of correction, that is, to re- 
press and prevent losses to public assets by means of 
investigations, inspections and disciplinary administra- 
tive procedures to verify the responsibility of public 
agents. 
The Office of the Ombudsman-General regulates and 
organizes ombudsman activities in the Federal Executive, 
and receives citizen manifestations on the rendering of 
public services, directing them to the responsible agen- 
cies and seeking solutions for the issues presented. 
The Secretariat for Preventing Corruption and Strate- 
gic Information aims to promote transparency in public 
management and develop preventative projects to inhibit 
and dissuade corruption. 
CGU is, therefore, the Brazilian federal government 
agency that centralizes internal control of public admini- 
stration, carrying out inspection and auditing activities of 
all its agencies and including agencies from other federa- 
tive levels, such as states and municipalities, when these 
receive federal funds. In the last two decades, the volume 
of federal resources transferred to municipalities has 
grown, especially for executing federal public policies in 
social areas. As most Ministries do not have structures 
dedicated to monitoring and evaluating public policies, 
CGU’s work has been an important instrument in verify- 
ing the execution of such federal funds transferred to 
municipalities. 
Based on such inspection and auditing, CGU produces 
reports on the execution of governmental programs that 
promote a level of transparency previously unheard of in 
Brazilian public management, and proposes organiza- 
tional changes to the inspected agencies, aiming at in- 
creasing the efficiency of public policy implementation 
and therefore of management quality. 
Audits are carried out in two stages: the first occurs in 
Brasília, when the CGU team goes to the Ministry to 
analyze the aspects of the federal program through which 
federal funds are transferred to municipalities; the second 
occurs in the municipalities receiving federal funds, in- 
spected by the CGU analyst teams that work in the states. 
Given the unfeasibility of inspecting the over 5500 mu- 
nicipalities, they are selected by lottery, and approxi- 
mately 200 municipalities are selected each year. Up to 
2009, approximately 1800 municipalities were inspected, 
which corresponds to 32% of the total. In this way, CGU 
builds an evaluation of policy operations not only at the  
ministerial level (on the policy management instruments 
at the federal level), but also at the implementation level, 
that is, in the municipalities, analyzing how the resources 
are actually used. CGU’s analyses on policy implementa- 
tion in municipalities are sent to the corresponding Min- 
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istry, so that it can the usually necessary measures re- 
garding adjustments in regulations and correcting prob- 
lems, frauds or inefficiency. 
CGU’s reports on inspecting federal policies in mu- 
nicipalities are published in CGU’s website and consti- 
tutes one of the first Brazilian experiences of public dis- 
closure of federal government activities with great re- 
percussion in the media and among those involved (the 
municipalities). Actually, disclosing the reports was part 
of the inspection program’s own strategy. Its purpose 
was not only to publish state actions, but also to generate 
among the unselected/uninspected municipalities a will- 
ingness to manage federal funds with more efficiency 
and probity, in face of their apprehension at becoming 
the object of inspection activities. In any case, disclosing 
such reports bears fruit such as transparency (in this case, 
CGU’s inspection activities and the management activi- 
ties of the inspected municipalities) and generation of 
information that is relevant from the point of view of 
social control (society obtained access to documents with 
information on the public management of their munici- 
pality, not divulged by their corresponding executive 
governments) and from the point of view of scientific 
knowledge (several academic papers were based on the 
data series supplied by the reports)4. 
Finally, it is important to note that the information 
generated in these CGU inspections had never been pro- 
duced, in most cases, even for the Ministries that imple- 
ment the inspected federal policies, since most of them 
do not have a system for monitoring their own policies. 
This is the case of the Ministry of Social Development, 
which is in charge, as mentioned, for implementing the 
federal governments social welfare policy and has as one 
of its goals to restructure social welfare policy in states 
and municipalities. It does this by means of regulating 
welfare actions and transfer of resources for such actions 
to be carried out by municipal public agents or private 
agents hired by the municipalities. 
3. Organizational Learning from Inspection 
and Auditing Processes: The Case of the 
Ministry of Social Development 
The exchange between the MDS’s National Secretariat 
for Social Welfare (SNAS) and CGU began in 2004, 
when the basic rules for the Unified Social Welfare Sys- 
tem (SUAS) were being prepared. SUAS articulates 
means, efforts and resources to execute social welfare 
programs, services and benefits, thus organizing the sup- 
ply of social welfare in all of Brazil, promoting social 
protection and well-being to families, children, teenagers 
and youths, people with disabilities, senior citizens—in 
short, to all who need it. One of SUAS’ main regulations 
are the Basic Operational Rules (NOB/SUAS—Normas 
Operacionais Básicas), which govern the System’s de- 
centralized administration, the relationship between the 
three government levels and how public resources are 
applied. 
Since SUAS was a new and recently implemented 
policy, CGU began to require that the Ministry send the 
program’s more detailed regulations, based on which it 
would inspect the municipalities. In such monitoring 
processes, meetings are required between CGU analysts 
and managers from the Ministries in charge of the in- 
spected program, mainly in two moments: the first occurs 
before the municipalities are inspected so that CGU can 
learn the characteristics of the policy as designed by the 
Ministry. The second moment of interaction between 
CGU and the Ministry occurs after inspection and in- 
volves the Ministry’s validation of the report prepared by 
CGU. In this second phase, discussions are often deeper 
and more conflicted, for they involve defining the rec- 
ommendations the Ministry must follow to correct the 
program’s gaps and inefficiencies found by CGU’s in- 
spection. Since CGU annually holds new lotteries and 
inspects new municipalities (those previously selected 
may be drawn again), the recommendations of the pre- 
vious year’s report and whether or not they were imple- 
mented are discussed each year, which is another source 
of potential divergence between the Ministry and CGU. 
In the case of SUAS, the relationship between CGU 
and the Ministry became a quite close “two-way street”: 
it meant learning for both CGU analysts and SNAS man- 
agers. This sort of relationship is very rare, for in most 
cases the Ministry is deeply resisting of the recommen- 
dations put forth by the controlling agency and the latter 
is reluctant to alter its internal auditing processes to the 
programs’ particulars. 
According to the interviewees, this relationship meant 
a very fruitful interaction and a great learning process for 
MDS and CGU. Although it was not an entirely harmo- 
nious process, since there were conflicts and disagree- 
ments, it ended up producing cooperative relationships,  
4Examples of papers based on data from CGU’s reports: Analysis of 
irregularities in FUNDEF’s municipal administration: verifications of 
the inspection program by public lotteries by the Office of the Com-
ptroller General (Marcos Mendes, Transparência Brasil, 2004); Expos-
ing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Au-
dits on Electoral Outcomes (Ferraz, C. and Finan, F., Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 2009), Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evi-
dence from the Audits of Local Governments (Ferraz, C. and Finan, F., 
American Economic Review, 2010), and Law Enforcement and Local 
Governance in Brazil: evidence from random audit reports (Zamboni 
Filho, Yves and Stephan Litschig, Mimeo, 2006). 
in which both parties (CGU analysts and Ministry man- 
agers) sought to build understanding and pursue the 
common goal of promoting quality in the SUAS imple- 
mentation. 
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The interactions between CGU and SNAS generated 
mutual efforts to understand the demands and form of 
working of each institution, allowing for organizational 
changes especially in MDS. CGU analysts demanded 
that SNAS prepare regulations on the program’s specifics 
and service production indicators so that they could in- 
spect the municipalities. This required SNAS to seek 
qualification to produce the information and to create a 
specific team to deal with matters and proceedings re- 
lated to inspection. This team is occupied with receiving 
and centralizing the demands of the controlling agencies 
(CGU and TCU), distributing them within the Ministry to 
prepare the response, collecting information from the 
municipalities about the problems identified in the in- 
spection and responding to the controlling agencies. 
SNAS, on the other hand, demanded that CGU analysts 
understand the SUAS specifics and the new logic of ren- 
dering social welfare services and consequently accepted 
new forms of service inspection. 
It is important to note that this learning process is not 
set forth in CGU’s inspection rules. It arose from practi- 
cal experience, by means of building room for dialogue 
in the inspection process, greater in scope than that set 
forth in the rules. Although there are mandatory meetings 
to be held between the CGU and Ministry teams, in the 
SUAS case this required greater mutual willingness and 
understanding. And it depended not only on holding the 
joint meetings foreseen in the rules, but also on building 
a relationship of mutual understanding over the years. 
This relationship was not set forth in the formal rules, 
and its creation and effectiveness relied on the reciprocal 
will and willingness of the actors involved. 
Through such a dialogue, a reciprocal organizational 
learning process can be experienced: the auditors learned 
about the SUAS regulations and parameters, which are 
different from those established in other social policies; 
on the other hand, the managers learned more about their 
own policy in their effort to present the program’s logic 
and characteristics and justify their choices before the 
CGU analysts. 
The analysts’ learning occurred in single-loop, in that 
they did not review their working procedures and rules, 
but merely took the policy’s specifics and the structure of 
the Ministry in question into consideration in the inspec- 
tion process. Although they spent more time in the SNAS 
audit than usual, this did not entail revising their working 
procedures or instruments. 
The MDS managers’ learning, on the other hand, oc- 
curred in double-loop, and may be described in three 
dimensions: creating regulations, restructuring proce- 
dures for policy implementation and organizational re- 
structuring. Let us look at each of these learnings more 
closely. 
MDS’ first learning dimension—the creation of SUAS 
regulations by SNAS—ensued in good part from CGU’s 
demands for more detailed rules about the program’s 
execution, in order to inspect it in the municipalities. In 
this way, CGU forced the Secretariat to define regula- 
tions (ordinances, decrees, law projects) with greater 
speed than it thought necessary. MDS interviewees re- 
ported that they always perceived CGU as very interested, 
requiring information on the program’s functioning to be 
able to perform the monitoring in the field and reading 
the Ministry’s documents to be able to guide municipali- 
ties in implementing the new policy. 
Naturally, CGU’s attribution of requiring that the pro- 
gram rules be clearly defined was initially felt as an en- 
cumbrance by the managers, for it demanded that they 
respond in a timeframe that was different from the one 
defined or desired by the managers. They slowly under- 
stood the importance of such requirements to qualify the 
program itself. One factor mentioned by the interviewees 
for the good relationship in this process was maintaining 
the same leader in the CGU team of analysts during all 
years of the program’s closer inspection, thus ensuring 
that the knowledge accumulated during the learning 
process was not lost. 
The second dimension of MDS’ learning involved the 
restructuring of the policy’s implementation procedures. 
As CGU pointed out problems in SUAS implementation 
in municipalities, SNAS had to revise the regulations and 
the incentive and control mechanisms over the municipal 
executive powers. Since most Brazilian Ministries do not 
have their own systems of monitoring and evaluation, the 
information produced by CGU in monitoring the mu- 
nicipalities are essential for the Ministries that implement 
programs in a decentralized manner to know what hap- 
pens at the other end of the system. 
These requirements initially caused a good deal of 
stress at SNAS, for it needed to interrupt its working rou- 
tine to prepare responses to CGU’s demands. Over time, 
the managers realized that CGU’s demands brought 
MDS important information about the program’s execu- 
tion that would otherwise not reach the Ministry. In this 
way, they began to see that the information produced by 
the CGU audits helped MDS to have a general view of 
the policy’s functioning and of its problems on a national 
scale, and therefore helped the Ministry to improve the 
program’s management quality. 
In addition, since CGU analysts are “external” agents 
for the Ministry and therefore have an “outside” view, 
they can help the managers to identify gaps not foreseen  
by the policymakers. This difference in perspectives may 
generate many divergences and some conflict between 
analysts and managers, but it can also be a source of mu- 
tual learning. This occurred in the issue of local level 
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government corruption and the Ministry’s responsibility 
for controlling the municipalities that receive transfers. 
Initially, the managers thought that CGU analysts wor- 
ried far too much about frauds. Indeed, CGU analysts are 
biased to identify gaps and errors, while managers priori- 
tize the policy’s functioning, assuming those involved 
will adhere to legal principles and regulations. 
As reported by an MDS interviewee, however, it was 
only after the CGU inspections that he realized the “mu- 
nicipalities are not always honest”. This means that the 
Ministry must indeed worry about irregularities that may 
occur in the program’s execution. Creating a new and 
well-meaning policy is not enough; there is also need for 
monitoring, control and punishment mechanisms. This 
generated a clear perception on the part of the managers 
of the importance of CGU’s work, thus changing their 
initial standing on the agency’s work. This relevance 
occurs not only in identifying and correcting irregulari- 
ties, but also contributes to improve the policy’s quality 
at the Ministry, state and municipal levels. 
Finally the third dimension of learning for MDS oc- 
curred at the level of organizational changes. CGU’s de- 
mands ensuing from inspecting the municipalities re- 
quired the Secretariat to qualify itself in order to interact 
with the controlling agencies, and, for that purpose, 
SNAS created a specific team to deal with matters related 
to inspection. This team receives and centralizes de- 
mands from the controlling agencies, distributes them 
within the Ministry to produce responses and collects 
information from the municipalities about the problems 
identified in the inspection. In fact, the Secretariat estab- 
lished a specific office dedicated to handling all matters 
related to inspection and interactions with all SNAS de- 
partments. Creation of this office helped improve the 
directives defined by the Secretariat regarding munici- 
palities. It was in this process that CGU’s work led 
SNAS to qualify itself considering both the program’s 
management (more clearly defining its implementation 
rules) and its internal organization (structuring a team 
and specific procedures to organize responses to the con- 
trolling agencies). 
Interviewees highlighted that in this process of creat- 
ing new structures and the corresponding need for more 
employees and resources, CGU’s demands helped the 
Secretariat to require institutional support from the Min- 
istry in the form of organizational resources, in order to 
fulfill the goals of the policies and programs and respond 
to the controlling agencies’ demands. In other words, 
CGU’s audits became a support for managers to demand 
from their superiors the necessary resources, such as 
personnel hiring and institutional reorganization, in order 
to solve problems in the policy’s execution. This can be 
seen as a singular aspect of this organizational learning 
experience: one external organization encourages another 
to learn and as a result of such learning there is a change 
in its own structure. 
In the MDS case, there was another fact in its favor: 
that the Ministry managed the Bolsa Família, one of the 
most important social programs of the Lula administra- 
tion and responsible for a significant part of the then 
President’s political legitimacy and high popularity, ac- 
cording to opinion surveys made in the country. For this 
reason, this Ministry had greater ease in obtaining finan- 
cial resources and hiring qualified personnel. Among the 
employees brought to MDS and SNAS were members of 
the career of Specialists in Public Policy and Govern- 
mental Management, known as EPPGG (Especialistas 
em Políticas Públicas e Gestão Governamental). This 
career was created in the 1990s for the purpose of sup- 
plying the federal government with highly qualified per- 
sonnel, specialized in management, without being per- 
manently allotted to a specific Ministry. Since they may 
be requested by any Ministerial office, they are very dis- 
puted. Another trait of members of this career is that they 
perceive public policy evaluation as an essential factor 
for the quality of state work, which concept is relatively 
new and little disseminated in the country [11]. Given the 
administration’s priority for social policies, MDS was 
able to recruit several EPPGGs, which reinforced its 
management capacity. 
Finally, it is important to note the likelihood of more 
organizational changes occurring, for MDS intends to 
create a specific agency to develop and manage the 
SUAS internal monitoring processes. In other words, the 
Ministry wishes to produce internally the information 
that CGU currently produces through municipality moni- 
toring, which will require the creation of new structures 
and processes. MDS this intends to ensure that it controls 
the production of information that is essential to the effi- 
ciency of its policy implementations. 
To sum up, the concrete results of these learning proc- 
esses were improvement of SUAS management and of 
CGU’s audits. The elements needed for this learning to 
occur were: 
 Joint meetings between analysts and managers to 
discuss SUAS inspection aspects. 
 Willingness of professionals to understand the view 
and position of their counterparts from the other in- 
stitution. 
 Availability for building the relationship of under- 
standing (primarily by maintaining the inspection and 
secretariat team leaders in their respective positions), 
so as to ensure that individuals’ acquired knowledge 
would stay in the organization. 
 Low institutionalization of SUAS and MDS, which 
were created less than 10 years ago and are being 
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structured (which implies the need for establishing 
rules and agencies and, at the same time, the lack of 
crystalized practices and institutions). 
 MDS’ privileged position regarding other Ministries 
in the “competition” for organizational resources. 
The first three elements refer to traits that can be pro- 
moted and disseminated by means of creating organiza- 
tional incentives to such behavior. The last two elements, 
on the other hand, are contingent factors that cannot be 
repeated at other organizations, and which absence in- 
creases the need to reinforce organizational incentives. 
The main element that hindered learning in this case 
was the divergence of views between CGU analysts and 
MDS managers, which took time to be reduced. It is, to 
some extent, a natural factor in the life of organizations, 
which create their own culture and vision regarding their 
work. 
Finally, this learning process may be leading to the 
creation of a deuterolearning process, since MDS intends 
to create its own structures for monitoring its policies. 
Monitoring activity by MDS tends to generate informa- 
tion and capacity for the Ministry to, by itself, identify 
policy gaps and correct them, and the evaluation proc- 
esses may become instruments through which the or- 
ganization learns to learn [12]. 
4. Conclusions 
In the analyzed case, organizational learning was gener- 
ated from demands that were external to the organization 
(CGU’s inspection in SUAS) and it was possible thanks 
to the way in which CGU and MDS interacted (joint 
meetings with the purpose of seeking understanding) and 
to MDS’ specific conditions, both organizational and 
contingent. 
This paper demonstrates that building a dialogue in the 
process of auditing and inspection led to improvement in 
the control process and in public policy management. 
Both CGU and MDS underwent learning processes. 
CGU analysts needed to learn the working and imple- 
mentation logic of a new policy such as SUAS, and MDS 
employees needed to produce rules and administrative 
procedures to support the inspection, as well as review 
concepts and procedures involved in MDS’ relationship 
with municipalities. 
On the part of MDS, the learning was adapting itself in 
order to be able to precisely define the information 
needed for the program’s implementation and inspection; 
on the part of the control agents, it was understood as a 
new policy, with a new dynamic and new form of im- 
plementation. There were conflicts in that process, for 
the views of MDS and CGU did not always coincide or 
easily fit together. But, over time, both parties were edu- 
cated, and room for understanding was built and could be 
Table 1. Organizational learning in new public agencies in 
democratic Brazil. 
CGU Learning (single loop) SNAS/MDS Learning (Double loop)
 Learning about the  
particulars of the inspected 
policy and the structure of 
the Ministry in charge of it.
 Creation of new regulations  
pertaining to execution of SUAS.
 Restructuring of the policy’s  
implementation processes,  
especially mechanisms of  
incentive and control over  
municipal executive powers. 
 Organizational changes: creation 
of a team to handle matters related 
to inspection. 
 
used to discuss new programs. The history of dialogue 
and building understanding makes it easier, for both sides, 
to build new understandings. 
Table 1 summarizes the learning processes described 
above. 
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